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Abstract
The concept of shame is important for Deleuze’s ethics and politics.
In this essay, shame is positioned within a nexus of concepts: the
intolerable, seeing, resistance, powerlessness, and belief in this world.
If one has fallen short, it is not because of who one is, how one is seen,
or how one has been judged, but it is, in part, because of one’s failure to
see what is intolerable. In this respect, shame, in particular ‘the shame
of the world’, has the potential to be a proto-political and proto-ethical
affect because it suspends and precludes the ready invocation of clichés
and explanations that buttress us against reality. This disruption in turn
opens a space for creativity and resistance.
Keywords: shame, Gilles Deleuze, resistance, indifference, intolerable,
Primo Levi
I. Stories of Shame
Shame is the affect that most reveals our orientation to and dependence
on others. Its searing intensity can cause us to hang our head in a
futile effort to make ourselves invisible. It exposes us. Some, like Silvan
Tomkins (1995), wonder at the way in which the feeling of shame can
be so intolerable that some even prefer death to it. He describes it as a
sickness in the self, but also sees it as the primary affect of intersubjective
life. Dominant motifs in discourses on shame include the failure or
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inadequacy of self in acceding to an ideal or to a moral standard set
by oneself or others, assaults on self-esteem, social exclusion, and a
painful sense of being positioned as object, thing-like or invisible, but
some experiences of shame can also invite an ethical orientation to the
Other and an opening to a shared world. Shame is intimately connected
with our relationships with others, not simply because we internalise
norms, values or standards, or because we may feel judged by others for
who we are, but because we can feel ashamed for what others, even those
who are strangers, have done or failed to do. Shame is an ambivalent
affect that is unreliable, contingent and contextual, and it can, of course,
be pernicious and debilitating when we are shamed for who we are or
others are ashamed of us. Yet, we can also feel ashamed before the Other
rather than for him or her, and we can feel ashamed of the state of our
world. It might seem then curious that a philosopher like Deleuze would
feel so drawn to the figurations of shame he finds in the writings of
Primo Levi, the shame of being human and the shame of the world,
yet perhaps it is not so surprising. The shame that interests him is one
uncoupled from personal judgement or shaming mechanisms. It inverts
the horizons so that the mechanisms of power, privilege, complicity,
banality and judgement are laid bare. Such ‘pre-personal’ shame offers
a normative position that does not prescribe how things ought to be but
only constitutes a refusal or negation of the intolerable nature of the
present, whilst recognising how we are all tainted by what others have
done or failed to do. This does not mean that we are all guilty. Through
these moments of disruption and recognition, a space opens up, inviting,
without guarantee of success, resistance and creativity.
In certain respects, the shame of being human resembles discourses
on moral shame, elemental shame, and even what Karl Jaspers calls
‘metaphysical guilt’, but Deleuze inverts those discourses so that it is
not just that I feel ashamed when the Other looks at me and appeals
to me, but rather that I become ashamed at those rare moments
when I become aware of my shamelessness, banality, insensibility and
indifference to others and to the world, my complicity in suffering, or
when I witness the brutality and pettiness of human existence. That is,
I become ashamed when my gaze turns outward and I see how things
are and what is happening, such that what was previously invisible is
suddenly seen as intolerable. Unlike those forms of shame that involve
group identification, this shame does not categorise and classify humans
privileging those whose perspectives I value, but it has a more expansive
reach. It involves a seeing that is admittedly unpredictable, contingent
and individual and does not offer a ground on which one could reliably
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base a substantive ethics or a politics. Rather like those unforeseeable
encounters in teaching when the world opens for a student or teacher,
aesthetic moments, including the experience of becoming undone that
is wrought by shame, that shift our sensibilities can interrupt the
complacency of ordinary life opening a space for critique, for the
creation of new forms of resistance and creativity, and for the genesis
of new becomings. This way of understanding shame is drawn in part
from Primo Levi, Henri Bergson and Michel Foucault, and whilst it has
affinities with the phenomenological and ethical approaches to shame
developed by Levinas and Sartre, specifically in relation to the encounter
with the Other, it is different, in respect of the antagonism of Sartre’s
account and the way in which Levinas understands responsibility for the
Other.
In Being and Nothingness (2003), Jean-Paul Sartre argues that shame
reveals our shared world despite the sense of vulnerability and exposure
that I undergo when the Other looks at me. His interest in shame
stemmed from his attempt to respond to the philosophical problem
of solipsism and the question of the existence of the Other: unable
to prove the existence of other subjects by means of the intellect or
reason – for all I know, those that I think of as human might be
marionettes or Descartes’ clockwork men – the experience of shame
reveals the unavoidable ontological vocation of my being-for-others.
When Sartre’s protagonist is, or imagines being, caught spying into a
keyhole, shame is overwhelming. When the Other looks at me, I am
pinned to my being, such that I no longer experience myself as freedom,
but simply as an object or being-in-itself fixed by the gaze of the Other,
the Other who kills off all my possibilities through that look. ‘I am
ashamed of what I am’ (Sartre 2003: 221) but I am only ever ashamed
before another and as I appear to the Other. This reveals, for Sartre, the
ambiguity of being both being-for-itself and being-in-itself. The distance
and reflexive relation to the self precipitated by the gaze of the Other is
at once necessary for the constitution of a world, a shared world, and
is a possible world, that is, a perspective on the world that is not mine.
This experience of disintegration when the world falls away from me
as though sucked towards a drain hole involves an experience of the
Other that is non-cognitive and pre-reflective, provoking a relation to
self that is strange, non-domesticated and oddly depersonalised. Shame’s
tonality, for Sartre, begins with becoming thing-like, akin to any other
object or being, before the Other.
Such an experience of shame also reveals the existence of other
subjects in the world, subjects whose reality is experienced viscerally
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as the face reddens and the head stoops. Others are thus encountered
and experienced rather than ‘known’, as they elude the appropriative
gaze by returning it. The Other is thus lived as shame. ‘I depend on
the other in my being. The other penetrates me to the heart’ (Sartre
2003: 237). The turn from bare exposure to the conflictual exchange of
the look begins once freedom is reasserted, as, sensing its vulnerability,
the ego reacts defensively gathering the armoury of the free subject.
Those short paragraphs that begin with the famous scene of the voyeur
trace a movement from self-satisfaction or egoism to acute vulnerability
and forced reorientation of the world, and finally back to a militant
aggressive egoism. Whilst Sartre is right to underline that a reaction to
shame can be expressed through anger, violence, conflict, resentment or
aggression, other responses are possible. In her book, Artificial Hells,
in a section called ‘Artist as Torturer’, Claire Bishop describes The
Working Family by artist Oscar Bony. Bony placed an ordinary working-
class Argentinian family on a plinth, and paid the head of the family
double his normal wages. She quotes Bony who said, ‘I find it extremely
important that there is a certain feeling of being at the limit’, and another
reviewer who wrote of the ‘shared humiliation of looking at these people
who have been paid in order to let themselves be seen’ (quoted in Bishop
2012: 117). Bony himself said ‘that the work was based on ethics,
for exposing them to ridicule made me feel uncomfortable’ (quoted in
Bishop 2012: 117), which is why he referred to himself as the torturer.
Like Sartre, Levinas argued in his early 1935 essay ‘On Escape’ that
in shame we feel ourselves naked, pinned down unable to hide from
ourselves, unable to escape (Levinas 2002). The more we try, the more
the body reddens and betrays. What shame reveals here, he says, is
being’s self-revelation, but this opaque, alien and impersonal self is
unrecognisable: it is ex-timate. John Llewelyn writing of Levinas suggests
that ‘Shame is founded upon the solidarity of our being, which obliges
us to claim responsibility for ourselves’ (Llewelyn 1995: 63, quoting
Levinas 2003: 63). In Levinas’s later writings, shame opens us to the
Other who concerns me. Rudi Visker writes:
The Other does not simply look at me. Its look concerns me. S/he is foisted
upon me. This face cannot leave me indifferent, and the shame that overcomes
me in the gaze of this appeal, even if I try to suppress it, reveals that I am more
than libertas indifferentiae. (Visker 2004: 151)
Levinas’s ideas shifted from ‘On Escape’, which he later disowned, but
the question of shame continued to concern him as the shadow of
genocide haunted his writing. Primo Levi asked in his chapter ‘Shame’
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in The Drowned and the Saved, ‘Are you ashamed because you are alive
in place of another? And in particular, of a man more generous, more
sensitive, more useful, wiser, worthier of living than you? You cannot
block out such feelings [. . . ].’ (Levi 1988: 63). Levinas, responding to
the same horror, writes:
My being-in-the-world or my ‘place in the sun’, my being at home, have these
not also been the usurpation of spaces belonging to the other man whom I
have already oppressed or starved, or driven out into a third world; are they
not acts of repulsing, excluding, exiling, stripping, killing? Pascal’s ‘my place
in the sun’ marks the beginning of the image of the usurpation of the whole
earth. (Levinas 1989: 82)
This radicalisation of the experience of shame highlights two of Levinas’s
supererogatory ethical commands: (1) substitution, as described by
Levinas above, and (2) the singular injunction to respond before the face
of the suffering other.
Such imagery of obedience and conversion conveys the involuntary
nature of shame. Without deciding, without reflecting, without an
interval, I am overwhelmed by the Other, fragile, exposed, singled out
by the face of the Other who stretches out an empty hand. I must tear
the food from my mouth. The significance of Levinas’s innovation here
cannot be understated. That which was a void for me, invisible, as I was
consumed by myself, intent on appropriating and on preserving my own
existence, suddenly makes its presence felt. Just like shame, this moment
of conversion has no logical precursor. The responsibility for and before
the Other is infinite and excessive. Shame itself is responsibility and one
can never have done enough. Through shame, ethics arises. Through
shame, one’s egoism is undone.
II. Invisibility, Indifference and Shamelessness
The shame of not having understood, of not wanting to understand what
has happened around you every day. [. . . ]
For there is not a European who is not revolted, indignant, alarmed at
everything, except at the fate to which the Arab is subjected.
Unperceived Arabs.
Ignored Arabs.
Arabs passed over in silence.
Arabs spirited away, dissimulated. [. . . ]
And you mingling with those:
Who have never shaken hands with an Arab.
Never drunk coffee with an Arab.
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Never exchanged commonplaces about the weather with an Arab.
By your side the Arabs.
Pushed aside the Arabs.
Without effort rejected the Arabs.
Fanon 1964: 48
In ‘Letter to a French Man’, Franz Fanon levels a series of accusations
at his correspondent and, by extension, at his reader. He describes as
‘shame’ the desire not to understand, a desire that sits comfortably with
the propensity displayed by the coloniser to engage in empty moralising
about Humanity whilst ignoring the brutal conditions of living human
beings in their cities – the Arabs of Algeria. He writes knowing that most
of those to and of whom he writes will remain untouched by shame. In
The Wretched of the Earth he says, ‘Leave this Europe where they are
never done talking of Man, yet murder men everywhere they find them,
at the corner of every one of their own streets, in all the corners of the
globe’ (Fanon 1963: 311). Words are hurled like weapons to try to make
his reader see what is before him or her, yet this is often to no avail
as such gestures are rejected when it is easier to obscure exploitation
and marginalisation with ready-made explanations, rote responses and
platitudes. This becomes even more likely when one is faced not only
with the intolerable but also with one’s complicity in its perpetuation.
Deleuze’s interest in shame and shamelessness, the latter understood
as indifference or insensibility, was developed through his exploration
of the concepts and experiences of the intolerable, resistance, seeing and
belief in the world. These are set against the backdrop of the horrors
and disappointments of the twentieth century. Not responding is a form
of shamelessness. Shamelessness, even if not referred to explicitly, is
implicit in much of what Deleuze writes about the nature of experience
in contemporary life, in particular when life seems less denied than
anaesthetised or deadened. This is even the case when lived experience
feels unliveable or lived at a distance from the body, perhaps distracted,
anxious and over-stimulated so that little can hold interest for long. Such
a tenor of existence is symptomatic of sad affects, the affects that cut us
off from ourselves, from others and from experience. In Cinema 2, he
describes this contemporary phenomenon vividly by saying:
The modern fact is that we no longer believe in this world. We do not even
believe in the events which happen to us, love, death, as if they only half
concerned us. It is not we who make cinema; it is the world which looks to
us like a bad film. (Deleuze 1989: 171)
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If we are scarcely capable of experiencing life, let alone creating
new possibilities of life, what could serve as a catalyst to shift our
sensibilities?
Gilles Deleuze offers a reading of shame that, whilst resisting the ways
in which life can become appropriative, egoistic, sedimented, habitual
and unable to respond to the existence of others, is less focused on
being seen or judged by the Other, than with one’s indifference to the
Other, and one’s capacity to buffer oneself against what is intolerable
in the world. He tries to find creative ways to de-personalise the self as
a way to intensify life in order to sense more and perceive more. This
singularisation of life opens one to the world. Like Levinas, he thinks
that part of the problem is coming to see, feel and sense, but this is so that
we can believe in the world or, as he says, the link between man and the
world. If shame reveals our inability to be solitary, isolated, atomic or
disconnected, it can help to counter the individualism of liberalism and
capitalism without falling prey to the nihilism of fascism by operating at
the level of desire and affect. It begins with the moment that one sees the
intolerable. In this respect, the kind of shame that involves seeing rather
than being seen does not involve feeling trapped, excluded or silenced,
because it is not a personal affair. If one has fallen short, it is not because
of who one is, but because of how one has been blind to others and to the
possibilities of life. In this respect, shame has the potential to be a proto-
political and proto-ethical affect because it suspends and precludes the
ready invocation of clichés and explanations. Shame reveals ‘how it is’,
how this is impossible, but also how from such impossibility, something
new may emerge to disrupt the dominant logic.
The sense of powerlessness precipitated by shame registers the
diminishment of Life, human and non-human, organic and inorganic,
but this need not lead to cynicism, nihilism or pessimism. The intensity
of, and capacity for, seeing that can arise with the experience of shame
and the perception of the intolerable in life invites the creation of a
link between ‘man and the world’, a new kind of camaraderie and a
confidence or belief in this world. This is consistent with the philosophies
of joy that Deleuze is drawn to in Bergson, Spinoza and Nietzsche, and
it provides him with a way of reworking the conundrum that people
desire their own repression. The capacity to affect and to be affected is at
the heart of Deleuze’s philosophy of experience and of joy so it matters
when we cease to be able to be affected. From Anti-Oedipus onward,
Deleuze and Guattari argue that lifting the veils of false consciousness
will not transform desire and will not enact revolutionary sentiments.
Instead, a politics of desire requires disruption at the level of affective
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life in order to create a space for different ways of seeing, perceiving and
thinking. Shame can be a precipitative force for both art and thought
as it interrupts, however briefly, the stupidities, cruelties and clichés
that foster insensibility and indifference to life, to possibility and to
becoming.
What is required, Deleuze and Guattari argue, is a clinical and creative
exercise of diagnosing ‘becomings in every passing present’ (Deleuze and
Guattari 1994: 112). This concept of ‘becoming’ is a complex one. It
describes at once the lived experience of duration, the zones of exchange
and indetermination engendered through contiguity and proximity, and
the line of flight that undoes fixity or stasis: ‘and’ is privileged over ‘is’,
relations are privileged over essence or identity. Becoming-other requires
encounters to bring us beyond ourselves, to move us, in order to help
us to institute new forms of relationality. However, as Dominic Smith
explains well in his analysis of shame in Deleuze and Levi, we have no
guarantees: humans are capable of terrible things, of appalling stupidity
and of dreadful banality (Smith 2007: 42). There are many ways in
which life can be diminished and discarded, sensibility dulled, and
experience thinned: Deleuze once said in a seminar, tell me what your
affections are and I will tell you who you are. This is perhaps why the
figure of the spiritual automaton, the Seer or visionary occupies such an
important place in his later writings. Rather than reacting mechanically
and habitually to stimuli and triggers, before even acting, one must first
see the world with an overwhelming intensity that can open one once
more to the possibility of creating a link with the world.
III. Willed Ignorance
But we had perceived without seeing.
Bergson 1965: 36
How and what we see makes a difference to how we understand
ourselves, what we can sense, and how we move through the world.
If, as Fanon and Primo Levi claim, we do not see, we desire to
not understand, or we refuse to see, why is this the case? Bergson
argues that it is in the nature of ordinary perception to see less rather
than more: ordinary perception subtracts from things. Perception in
everyday life is neither disinterested nor contemplative but operates as
a function of utility, convenience and interest, enabling us to live in a
very practical sense. However, the systematic elimination of what does
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not appear immediately useful or relevant can lead to the sensory-motor
response that Deleuze calls ‘cliché’. Clichés make it easier to ignore the
‘mess’, as Samuel Beckett says. Invoking platitudes is less discomfiting
than facing the intolerable or abiding with a feeling of powerlessness
when one knows neither how to respond nor what to do. Dullness of
sensibility, narrowness of perception and stultification of thought further
calcify through the repetition of ready-made reactions, leading to the
alienation of humans from themselves, from one another and from the
world. Clichés are imposed without sensitivity to context or matter,
enabling us to tolerate almost anything. So a life lived through cliché
encourages shamelessness, understood as indifference, insensibility or
apatheia. However, when shame overcomes us, and shame is only ever
involuntary, its intensity makes it impossible to remain indifferent.
Deleuze writes:
We have schemata for turning away when it is too unpleasant, for prompting
resignation when it is terrible, and for assimilating when it is too beautiful.
It should be pointed out that even metaphors are sensory-motor evasions,
and furnish us with something to say when we no longer know what to do.
They are specific schemata of an affective nature. Now this is what a cliché
is. A cliché is the sensory-motor image of the thing. Bergson says, we do not
perceive the thing or the image in its entirety, we always perceive less of it, we
only perceive what we are interested in perceiving, or rather what it is in our
interest to perceive, by virtue of our economic interests, ideological beliefs and
psychological demands. We therefore normally perceive only clichés. (Deleuze
1989: 20)
In The Drowned and the Saved, Levi calls ‘willed ignorance’, a
deliberate refusal to see what is before one. He says, ‘There are those
who faced by the crime of others or their own, turn their backs so
as not to feel touched by it [. . . ]’ (Levi 1988: 65). This is a vaster
shame because those who might have done something chose to ignore
what was happening, seeking to retrospectively justify themselves, or
deciding not to ask too many questions. ‘Not seeing was a way of
not knowing and [. . . ] not knowing relieved them of their share of
complicity and connivance’ (65). Shame was avoided through willed
ignorance. However, avoiding shame was impossible for those exiled to
the Lager, like Levi. He tells the Germans that they, the inhabitants of the
camps, ‘were not able not to see’ as ‘pain, past and present, surrounded
us, and its level rose from year to year until it almost submerged us’ (65).
No one in the camps either wanted to, or could, become an island
but the factories of isolation, death, brutality and uniformity created a
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Hobbesian desert with rare moments of goodness. Levi then says with a
terrible honesty:
The just among us, neither more nor less numerous than any other social
group, felt remorse, shame and pain for the misdeeds that others and not
they had committed, and in which they felt involved, because they sensed
that what had happened around them, in their presence, and in them,
was irrevocable. [. . . ] It would prove that man, the human species –we,
in short –were potentially able to construct an infinite enormity of pain;
and that pain is the only force that is created from nothing, without cost
and without effort. It is enough not to see, not to listen, not to act.
(Levi 1988: 66)
Albert Camus (1961) meditates on what it means to be ashamed for
someone else in ‘Letters to a German Friend’. In the back of a truck,
eleven Frenchmen are being transported to be shot. Five or six have
done nothing to warrant this. ‘The hour is harder for them because they
are dying by mistake or as victims of a kind of indifference’ (Camus
1961: 15). A sixteen-year-old boy sits there terrified. The chaplain seated
amongst them tries to comfort him and encourage him to accept his
imminent death. Later the boy spots a narrow space in the canvas and
jumps from the truck. ‘For a second the priest stares at those men looking
at him in silence’ (17) but then he alerts the drivers, ‘Achtung!’. They give
chase and the boy is recaptured. Camus writes of the shame one feels for
and before the priest, at his hypocrisy, his betrayal, his complicity.
On a number of occasions Deleuze recalls howmoved he was by Levi’s
short phrases ‘the shame of being human’ and ‘shame of the world’.
Shame does not here imply guilt, or even responsibility, and it cannot
be readily transformed into courage as Len Lawlor and Janae Sholtz
(2012) intimate. Shame tells us that we are all sullied and tainted by
what we humans have done to one another, and by the state of our
world –we are not islands. This is not to say we are guilty – to suggest
so would be to diminish the acts and responsibility of the perpetrators.
The feeling of shame can precipitate a sensory-motor break, its intensity
forces us to see ourselves, whilst its solidary orientation (for good or ill)
and the sociality required for its activation, undoes us, taking us beyond
ourselves. Shame marks our interdependence –we are beings of relation,
or, to use Deleuze’s terminology, we are becomings-other. Although
Deleuze acknowledges shame’s composite nature, what is also of interest
is the way in which shame is coupled with the resistance and the
intolerable. This invites another way of understanding the relationship
between shame, powerlessness, seeing and belief in the world – the motifs
The Politics of Affect in the Thought of Deleuze 11
most commonly associated with the discussions of the intolerable in
his work. One of his most important conceptual innovations in placing
shame within this particular constellation of concepts was to uncouple it
from judgement. Because shame invites consideration of the experience
of the world and others, it serves as a reminder that that which is ‘other’
than us exists. In this respect, it is welcome because its disruptive quality
helps to open us to becoming-other, to that which is not ourselves.
If the natural tendency of humans is to select or distort in order to
ensure that perception is aligned with our interest, there is ‘a constant
effort of the mind to limit its horizon, to turn away from what it has
a material interest in not seeing’ (Bergson 1965: 13). This leads to the
propensity to confuse the nature of things with what is simply useful.
In Cinema 2, Deleuze argues that we live in a civilisation of clichés and
that the task is to break through or get out of the cliché. Like Bergson,
he believes that:
Everyday life can be nourished and illuminated by [bringing perception
back to its origins]. For the world into which our senses and consciousness
habitually introduce us is no more than the shadow of itself: and it is as cold
as death. (Deleuze 1989: 128)
A dogmatic image of thought premised upon recognition and identity
contributes to this deadening if it eliminates or incorporates what is new,
unfamiliar, strange, different or intolerable, thus precluding contact with
the real. In this respect, the importance of resisting clichés is not confined
to critiques of mass culture, the cult of marketing or the cognitive or
affective turns in contemporary capitalism. Rather, it evokes some of the
central Bergsonian concepts that Deleuze examined throughout his life,
including the complex relationship between epistemology, experience,
ethico-political life and becoming. If Bergson teaches anything, it is
that thinking, be it in the mode of ready-made ideas or intuition, is
inseparable from pathos, perception, sensibility and affective life. If the
problem is that we no longer believe in the world then the relational
nature of shame may institute new forms of relationality. Concepts force
us to see differently. But can an affect force us to see differently, and
of all the affects, why is it shame that will help us come to face the
intolerable, perhaps helping us believe in the world once more?
IV. Shame Is a Revolution
Creating ways to resist capitalism and fascism is not straightforward.
For Deleuze and Guattari, capitalism can always add another axiom in
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order to incorporate that which resists it, and fascism operates at the
level of desire, which is why the masses desire their servitude more than
their freedom. Explanations, reasoning or clarification therefore often
change little in practice of living and the politics of everyday life. The
transformation of modes of existence is not a simply cognitive matter of
illuminating the minds of the people with the truth of ‘how things are’:
revealing the fact of their repression will not work well as a strategy to
dispel false consciousness. Radical change must first take place at the
level of desire, affect and perception. This creates the potential for new
kinds of assemblages and relations, and thus new modes of existence.
The importance of shame for Deleuze’s philosophy and politics derives
from his attention to the importance of desire and affect in political
life. Affect is often described as a passage or becoming that involves
a lived transition from one affective state to another, in particular the
elements relating to Nietzsche and Spinoza. However, certain affects,
such as shame, involve vacillation or ambivalence that can be painful,
paralysing and disquieting. In other experiences of affective life, there is
a sense that power and the concomitant capacity to act has increased or
decreased, with such variations indicating which relations or encounters
agree with us, and which disagree. These variations are registered at
the level of experience, felt as joy or sadness, and they condition the
subsequent capacity to affect and be affected. In What is Philosophy?,
the concept of affect takes on a different tenor as when Deleuze and
Guattari say, ‘The affect goes beyond affections no less than the percept
goes beyond perceptions. The affect is not the passage from one lived
state to another but man’s nonhuman becoming’ (Deleuze and Guattari
1994: 123). Although Spinoza viewed shame as a species of sadness,
Deleuze understood it to be a potentially productive and critical affect.
This persistent invocation of a constellation of concepts – shame,
the intolerable, seeing, powerlessness, resistance and belief – seems at
odds with the overall orientation of Deleuze’s philosophy of joy;
however, once the broader context of his political and ethical concerns
is underlined, it appears less so. In an interview with Antonio Negri,
Deleuze says, ‘Men’s only hope lies in a revolutionary-becoming: the
only way of casting off their shame or responding to what is intolerable’
(Deleuze 1995: 171). The ‘or’ that separates ‘shame’ and the ‘intolerable’
here is best read as Spinoza’s sive – casting off their shame, that is,
responding to the intolerable. ‘Revolutionary-becoming’ is precipitated
by an affect that is lived, undergone and impersonal, correlating with,
or more precisely, registering the state of the world. Shame begins in
and with an experience of impossibility and/or powerlessness. This is
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not the only way in which Deleuze will conceptualise shame, however,
this reading is particularly interesting in that it refuses more familiar
accounts of shame that rest upon the implicit or explicit judgement
of (potential) others, without losing the intensity of what it means to
undergo shame. His response to Negri also underlines his ambivalence
in relation to shame – on the one hand it is to be cast off, but on the other
hand resistance, or revolutionary-becoming, may emerge as a response
to shame. Shame continues to remain here a strangely solidary rather
than solitary affect, and the turbulent experience of shame may force
one to ‘see’ the intolerable, an (impossible) experience that Deleuze will
call visionary. Shame is, in this respect, a proto-political affect that Marx
characterised well when he described shame as revolution. Resonant
with this reading, John Marks writes:
‘Shame’ is a key theme in Deleuze’s work, but a shame which is active and
affirmative, rather than reactive and inward-looking. In simple terms, feeling
shame at a personal level is of little interest to Deleuze, but there is an
indefinite, impersonal form of shame. (Marks 2003: 115)
Whilst political philosophy must turn around the analysis of
capitalism (Deleuze 1995: 171), philosophy itself is made political
through shame. The shame of being human is ‘one of the most
powerful incentives towards philosophy’ (Deleuze 1995: 172). Deleuze’s
positioning of shame in a revolutionary framework echoes Marx’s very
short reflections on shame and draws explicitly upon Primo Levi’s
‘shame of being a man’ and ‘shame of the world’. In his essay, ‘In This
Exile’, Agamben comments that ‘Marx still used to put some trust in
shame’ (Agamben 2000: 132). The short letter to which Agamben refers
was written to Arnold Ruge ‘on a barge to D. in 1843’. Marx claims
that shame is an antidote to self-deception, saying, ‘The glorious robes
of liberalism have fallen away and the most repulsive despotism stands
revealed for all the world to see’ (Marx 1967: 204). Shame already is a
revolution:
This, too, is a revelation, although a perverted one. It is a truth that at
least teaches us to recognize the hollowness of our patriotism, the unnatural
character of our government, and to turn our faces away in shame. Smiling,
you look at me and ask, ‘What is gained thereby? No revolution results
from shame.’ I answer, ‘Shame already is a revolution.’ Shame actually is
the victory of the French Revolution over German patriotism by which the
Revolution was conquered in 1813. Shame is a type of anger, introverted
anger. And if a whole nation were to feel ashamed it would be like a lion
recoiling in order to spring. (Marx 1967: 204)
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What does Marx mean when he says shame already is a revolution?
He does not mean the debilitating experience of being shamed that
may find expression and an outlet through anger or violence, or even
the poetic rage of Pasolini’s La Rabbia. This statement indicates,
rather, a quality of affect that involves tension, incommensurability,
disparateness, potential energy and perhaps ambivalence, experienced
as intensified paralysis: action is delayed or suspended as one does
not know what to do or how to respond, but respond one must.
Sometimes there might be a sense of ‘a complete margin where I already
felt the pre-existence of objects yet to come, and of an entire field of
virtualities and potentialities which I already knew were capable of
being actualised’ (Deleuze 1990: 305). However, writing of May 1968,
Joan Copjec claims that Deleuze’s account of affect becomes ‘more
murderous than murmuring’ (Copjec 2006: 94), saying that affect ‘is
less a mantle surrounding perception than perception’s inner division,
its dislocation from itself’ (2006: 94). Shame ‘does not familiarize,
domesticate or subjectivize – on the contrary, it estranges’ (2006: 95).
The estranging and paralysing experience that is shame performs an
important role in the development of Deleuze’s ethics and politics, and is
related to his commitment to subvert the human tendency to assimilate
that which is unfamiliar, strange and new. Becoming-other must be
assembled at the level of desire, not at the level of the ideology or
reason, and the disjunctive nature of the experience of shame helps
to disrupt the smooth logic of capitalism. Capitalism, as Deleuze and
Guattari emphasise throughout A Thousand Plateaus, can always add
another axiom, appropriating and subsuming that which might serve as
a challenge to its modus operandi.
Although shame can be used as a weapon of humiliation and a
way of excluding those who do not fall within the parameters of the
‘normal’, this relates to a personal shame that is to do with who one
is or how one feels one is seen. Deleuze is more interested in shame
as a way of seeing. In order to think further about this, let us reflect
upon a couple of examples from contemporary art practice. Santiago
Sierra has developed works that precipitate complex experiences of
shame in a way that resonates with the conceptualisation of shame
developed by Deleuze. One of Sierra’s works, a moving exhibition
called the ‘No, Global Tour’, was a large half-ton sculpture on the
back of a truck that simply stated, ‘No’. His ‘No’ pieces have since
been positioned in, or travelled through, different contexts constituting
a form of refusal that itself refuses to engage in polemics or debate.
Sierra’s works are themselves often exploitative and through these
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(arguably) more minor forms of exploitation they lay bare a vaster
exploitation that is intolerable. The works draw into relief the complicity
of consumers with capitalist practices of expropriation and oppression,
as well as the complicity of citizens with structured and systemic forms
of abandonment, confinement and exclusion. In the artist’s description
of the action 160 cm Line Tattooed on 4 People (2000) Sierra says:
Four prostitutes addicted to heroin were hired for the price of a shot of heroin
to give their consent to be tattooed. Normally they charge 2,000 or 3,000
pesetas, between 15 and 17 dollars, for fellatio, while the price of a shot of
heroin is around 12,000 pesetas, about 67 dollars.1
If we, as many have done, respond to this provocation with outrage,
why do we fail to respond with similar outrage to the everyday situation
of these women? It may feel intolerable to witness such an action in
situ or through its documentation, but the world in which these women
live is intolerable and yet this is not remarked upon because such
daily occurrences remain out of view, out of field and imperceptible,
allowing us to deny or ignore our complicity in creating and sustaining
intolerability in the lives of others.
Deleuze writes that ‘There is no democratic state that’s not
compromised to the very core by its part in generating human misery’
(Deleuze 1995: 173). Sierra’s work makes us see the world that is before
our eyes. Small acts of brutality lay bare the infinite and unapologetic
cruelty of capitalism, leaving the viewer discomfited, without a way out,
without escape, yet paradoxically without being riveted to one’s being.
Words like unease, ambivalence, hesitancy or even paralysis are often
used to describe the experience of these pieces. We become ashamed
because we are confronted with the ease with which we ordinarily
tolerate that which is clearly intolerable and are unable to find a response
that could smooth over our dilemma into a ready-made response or
cliché. Shame in such instances can feel incomprehensible since we
have done nothing. Such shame may appear irrational to others, in
particular when the sense of shame was not catalysed by one’s own
action or inaction, or by a judgement on one’s being, but simply by
a shift in perception that changes our vision of what is before us.
Phil Collins’s film How to Make a Refugee (1999) participates in the
unrelenting and exploitative lens and in situ editing of news crews
who believe that the humanitarian mobilisation of shame will stop
the violence of the perpetrators, yet it is Collins’s ambivalence and
complicity in the process that reveals the callous nature of the way in
which images, like that of a young Kosovar refugee boy, are created
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for mass consumption. Shame marks and acknowledges complicity in
oppression at an affective level, and this feels unbearable. Deleuze
describes this as being responsible before rather than for – even though
we are not all executioners, nonetheless we are tainted as humans by the
actions of others.
V. The Intolerable
In Rossellini’s Europa ’51, the anti-heroine, Irene, tells her bourgeois
friends and family what she has seen and learned in the tenement, the
slum and the factory. ‘I never knew,’ she says. Her desire to give help to
those in need is dictated by the situations that she encounters, appearing
closer to logic than principle, but her steady refusal to return to her
sheltered existence eventually leads to her institutionalisation. Beneath
her window in the asylum her friends from the slums cry out that
she is a saint, those in power, who will quickly agree to her indefinite
internment, suspect that she may be one, while she says, ‘I’d rather lose
myself with others than save myself on my own.’ Figures like Irene,
Bartleby or Billy Budd populate Deleuze’s texts. They are not political
actors, nor are they creators of new possibilities of life, but they are
important because they ‘jam the machines’ sufficiently to allow us to
see, as Beckett will say, ‘how it is’. A different example of this is found
in the work of the artist Seamus Nolan, whose intervention, ‘The 10th
President of Ireland: William Delaney 1957–1970’, involved asking the
serving President of the Republic of Ireland, Michael D. Higgins, if
he would hand over power to William Delaney for a nominal though
symbolic period of time, be it a minute, an hour or a day. Willie
Delaney is long dead, a child who died as a result of his internment
in an institution through the head injuries that he suffered in Letterfrack
Industrial School.
Francis McKee (2013) writes in the text accompanying the exhibition
that:
[Nolan] understands the need to acknowledge the shame and the failed
responsibility that accompanies the findings of the Ryan Report. For both
the state and the citizen it is not enough in this situation to sentimentalise the
victims and to evoke only sensations of pity and sadness. A fitting monument
demands a dynamic moment acknowledging the disturbing truths of the
situation, the anger and the pain, the abdication of responsibilities. (McKee
2013)
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Shame, rather than compassion or pity, accompanies the experience and
recognition of the incommensurable and the intolerable. In his Proposal,
Nolan writes:
this is a commemoration not just to the survivors of institutional abuse, but
to those who did not survive, those who have been implicated by history in
their silence and failure to intervene, and to those who are brave enough to
acknowledge our collective failing and move forward in a process of healing.
(McKee 2013)
In the Irish context, a long legacy of institutional abuse, and the
complicity of Church, State, family and community in the practice of
coerced institutionalisation makes it difficult for those who lived through
the twentieth century to say, ‘we never knew’. Even those who were
children at that time, and those not yet born, can feel shame that this
happened and can ask what the ether of the everyday and ‘everyone
knows’ blinds us from seeing today, just as it did when the imprisonment
of children and single mothers was ‘normal’.
It is not assured that State and institutional responses to shame
necessarily lead to more open and participatory institutions; they may
lead to cover-ups and obfuscation through bureaucratic procedures or to
more subtle and invisible methods of control. In Discipline and Punish,
Michel Foucault describes the way in which the legal violence of the
executioner became seen as shameful, leading to efforts by the system of
justice to distance itself from the punishments it meted out. He writes
that:
In modern justice and on the part of those who dispense it there is a shame
in punishing, which does not always preclude zeal. This sense of shame
is constantly growing: the psychologists and minor civil servants of moral
orthopaedics proliferate on the wound that it leaves. (Foucault 1995: 10)
They encourage ‘humane’ punishment and rehabilitation: the technology
of the soul. Yet even if responses to, for example, the shame
of spectacular punishment bring with them their own shames and
alternative shaming mechanisms, like the deficit views of the person in
prison that underpin cognitive behavioural programmes or mandatory
participation in life skills programmes, this does not mean that efforts
to grasp and resist what is intolerable should abate. Teaching in a
prison brought its own shames in my case, but the ethical imagination
provoked by moving within those walls helped me to understand the
lived implications of what Foucault calls the ‘pseudo-sciences’ and
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my complicity in legitimating the status quo by not contesting the
authoritative claims made about human nature in those spaces.
Primo Levi outlines the complexity of this sense of complicity when
he describes the strange phenomenon of the shame of those who did
nothing to warrant such a feeling, exiled as they were to the Lager, just
as he saw the shamelessness of those who were perpetrators of atrocity.
He writes:
Another vaster shame, the shame of the world [when] those who faced by
the crime of others or their own, turn their backs so as not to see and
not feel touched by it: this is what the majority of Germans did during
the twelve Hitlerian years, deluding themselves that not seeing was a way
of not knowing, and that not knowing relieved them of their share of
complicity of connivance. But we were denied the screen of willed ignorance.
(Levi 1988: 65)
Deleuze and Guattari, following Levi, describe shame as a composite
affect that is experienced not only before extreme situations, but also in
trivial situations, ‘in insignificant conditions, before the meanness and
vulgarity of existence that haunts democracies, before the propagation
of these modes of existence and of thought-for-the-market, and before
the values, ideals and opinions of our time’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994:
107–8).
With little effort, one can find many examples of more ‘minor’
instances of shame. One summer, I stopped before two beluga whales
in an aquarium in Valencia. Their sense of distress and depression was
palpable as one persisted in hitting his blowhole up against the thick
glass by the piping as though trying to breathe the world in, whilst the
other swam frenetically up and down the narrow cage. It is hard not
to feel shame at such moments. In the novel, Elizabeth Costello, the
main protagonist, Elizabeth, describes the ‘heavily affective sensation’ of
being a body, ‘of being alive to the world’ (Coetzee 2004: 78). She then
remarks that:
fullness of being is a state hard to sustain in confinement. [. . . ] To me it
suggests that the freedom of the body to move in space is targeted as the
point at which reason can most painfully and effectively harm the being of
the other. (Coetzee 2004: 78)
She speaks of ‘creatures least able to bear confinement’ in laboratories
or zoos and in institutions where the ‘flow of joy that comes from [. . . ]
simply being an embodied being has no place’ (Coetzee 2004: 78–9).
Why is it so difficult to see this?
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One afternoon I walked with a young man, a prisoner, down the steel
central stairs of the prison block in which I sometimes teach philosophy.
We chatted as we walked and then the prison officer opened the gate.
My instinct was to say, ‘After you,’ but I could not, and this small
incivility, this inability to extend the tiniest of polite gestures, revealed
that we lived in worlds apart – I walked out and he stayed behind. I
felt ashamed that our difference was made so conspicuous through my
failure of basic civility, even though it would have been an impossible
act given the context to make this tiny gesture of politeness and decency,
the kind of gesture that is the condition for any convivial existence.
Having spent months trailing my fingers along the iron mesh and the
bars, looking at the barbed wire against the sky, I understood all of
a sudden: this is a prison, and what it does is intolerable, extending
far beyond confinement, corroding the fabric of the last semblances of
ordinary relationships. Coming to see what is intolerable sometimes only
requires a tiny shift in perception like a gesture, a word, an omission or
a story: ‘It will be said that this enlarging is impossible. How can one
ask the eyes of the body, or those of the mind, to see more than they can
see?’ (Bergson 1965: 35).
Deleuze turns to the example of Foucault’s work on prisons and with
prisoners when he describes Foucault as a kind of seer, saying, ‘what
he saw was actually intolerable’ (Deleuze 2006: 274). He claims that
for Foucault, thinking was a reaction to the intolerable, describing (1)
thinking as experimentation, and (2) thinking as vision, ‘as capturing
the intolerable’ (275). When asked whether this was a kind of ethics, he
says the ethic was ‘to see or grasp something as intolerable’ (275). Yet,
what made it intolerable was that no one saw it, ‘it was imperceptible’
(275) even though everyone ‘saw’ it, everyone knew. Foucault saw it.
This involves seeing something imperceptible in the visible. ‘It was two
things: seeing something unseen and thinking something that was almost
at a limit’ (277). Deleuze moves between different positions in respect of
the question of the intolerable. At times, it seems sufficient that we see
and grasp the intolerable, yet at other moments, as in the interview with
Negri, he states that we experience the intolerable and feel trapped:
For it is not in the name of a better or truer world that thought captures the
intolerable in the world. On the contrary, it is because the world is intolerable
that it can no longer think a world or think itself. The intolerable is no longer
a serious injustice, but the permanent state of a daily banality. Man is not
himself a world other than the one in which he experiences the intolerable
and feels trapped. (Deleuze 1995: 169–70; original emphasis)
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Deleuze returns over and again to the question of the ‘intolerable’ in
his later writings. Why is it that we cannot seewhat is before us? Why do
we accept the intolerable? What makes the world intolerable? He writes:
In order for people to be able to bear themselves and the world, misery has
to reach the inside of consciousness and the inside has to be like the outside.
[. . . ] People would not accept the intolerable if the same ‘reasons’ were not
insinuating themselves in them in order to make them adhere from the inside.
(Deleuze 1989: 209)
The question of the intolerable is undoubtedly complex and Deleuze
mobilises the term in different ways depending on the context. In What
is Philosophy?, and in his interviews, shame and the intolerable are
invoked together. This is not the case in Cinema 2, but I want to argue,
even if Deleuze does not do so explicitly, that coming to see can be part
of the experience of shame precisely because shame forecloses a ready
response by instituting a sensory-motor break that precludes automatic
reaction (even if shame may quickly give rise to anger).
VI. Seeing and Belief in This World
What counts is what amounted to a visionary phenomenon, as if a society
suddenly saw what was intolerable and also saw the possibility for something
else. It is a collective phenomenon in the form of: ‘Give me the possible,
or I will suffocate . . . ’ The possible does not pre-exist, it is created by the
event. It is a question of life. The event creates a new existence, it produces a
new subjectivity (new relations with the body, with sexuality, the immediate
surroundings, with culture, work . . . ). (Deleuze 2006b: 234)
To see the intolerable is not enough; one must see the possibility for
something else. The analysis of neo-realist cinema in Cinema 2 in which
Deleuze describes the psychic situation of the seer is not just another
contribution to studies on this particular era of film-making. It tells
of the devastation of the post-war world in which denizens wander
the earth, lost, unable to act, powerless, but capable of seeing the
intolerable. Deleuze also finds these characters – Idiots, Seers – in other
forms of the arts, like literature. They always fail to understand what
everyone knows and they will not or cannot act as everyone commands.
They do not appear to have the facility to react ‘appropriately’ to
the situations in which they find themselves. They see rather than act.
The Seer replaces the Agent – that intentional subject who examines
the world, identifying his or her ends, and then deciding on the best
means of action. Agency will not help to restore the world; what is
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needed is a character who ‘sees better and further than he can react,
that is, think’ (Deleuze 1989: 169) because not power but powerlessness
will help us to believe in life, and ‘discover the identity of thought
and life’ (Deleuze 1989: 169). For Zourabichvili (2012), belief involves
affirmation without knowledge, perception or thinking –we affirm what
we cannot yet think. In what other ways might this strange formulation
‘belief in the world’ be understood? What can Deleuze mean when he
says that ‘The link between man and the world is broken’ (Deleuze 1989:
171)? These statements return us to our initial reflections on clichés, on
shame and the intolerable.
This aesthetic and political problem of the intolerable that is mapped
in the delineation of the cinematic time-image in Cinema 2 is also
a problem for life. When shame puts into crisis the complacency
of everyday existence and common sense, drawing to visibility the
impossibility of living under a given set of conditions, this marks a
point of impasse and impotence. The experience also creates sensitivity
to the richness of the present, to the forgotten histories, excluded
others, silenced voices and unrealised worlds as well as to the real
potentials of a concrete situation. Shame is excessive, rupturing the
habits of the everyday, and drawing to light the limits of sensibility in
a way that allows us to see. This disruptive force is the other face of
becoming, the composition of relations and joyful affects that Nietzsche
and Spinoza describe so well. (When I don’t care, can’t imagine, and
can’t begin to sense life from the standpoint of others, creating new
becomings and forging links and connections is not only elusive, but I
have no motivation to do so.) The project of restoring immanence is not
another call to return to nature, but concerns rather an ethico-political
proposition that wonders about the kinds of connections that a society
might be capable of collectively creating.
Deleuze seldom used the word ‘utopian and when he did, he did so
with a good deal of reticence. A philosophy of immanence does not
imagine and construct other worlds. John Llewelyn quotes a line of a
poem attributed to Paul Éluard. It says, ‘There is another world, but
it’s this one’ (Llewelyn 2008: 307). This seems to capture something of
Deleuze’s exhortation ‘to believe in the world’. Deleuze and Guattari say:
But, on the new plane, it is possible that the problem now concerns the one
who believes in the world, and not even in the existence of the world but in
its possibilities of movements and intensities, so as once again to give birth to
new modes of existence, closer to animals and rocks. (Deleuze and Guattari
1994: 74)
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The originators of the Radical Enlightenment, Spinoza and
Machiavelli, taught us that we must begin with how humans are, rather
than how we would like them to be; since there is no other world, no
heaven or hell, salvation must take place on this earth. Likewise, we
must begin with the world and perceive the becomings of which it is
capable. Becoming is not about transformation or change so much as
about being open to instituting the communication of heterogeneous
elements in unforeseeable ways. For one person, it might be Music
for Eighteen Musicians by Steve Reich, for another the movement of
a sparrow through the grass, for another being asked what they thought
for the first time. We act as though the world does not exist or is apart
from us so that we are not touched or moved by it. When we are over-
stimulated, as often we are in contemporary life, then ‘boring holes’,
‘puncturing’ and locating interstices, fissures and voids is one way of
disrupting complacency, cynicism and clichés. I have suggested here that
certain experiences of shame can be revolutionary in that they create,
as Silvan Tomkins says, a silence in communication, allowing us to
create something new. Deleuze and Guattari say, ‘It is still necessary to
discover, beneath the noise of actions, those internal creative sensations
or those silent contemplations that bear witness to a brain’ (Deleuze and
Guattari 1994: 213). Shame invites such contemplation by precluding
ready responses to stimuli and situations. It is a proto-political affect
opening us to others and the world. However, shame will not make
a revolution, even if it is itself already a revolution. Yet, perhaps the
intensity of undergoing a shame that forces us both to see the world and
to grasp our complicity in its impoverishment and misery may invite a
different relation to the world. If we must come to believe in the world,
which means believing in the link between man and the world, we have
to see that the link has been broken. Deleuze writes:
The concept must be replaced with the ‘percept’, that is with a perception in
becoming. It requires a new community whose members are capable of trust
or ‘confidence’, that is, of a belief in themselves, in the world and in becoming.
(Deleuze 1998: 87–8)
A different perceptual politics, an involuntarist politics, forces us to see
that which we do not wish to perceive.
Note
1. <http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/sierra-160-cm-line-tattooed-on-4-
people-el-gallo-arte-contemporaneo-salamanca-spain-t11852/text-summary>
(last accessed 10 October 2016).
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